Analysis of Institutional Independence and Autonomy of Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies in the Context of the Presidential Government System

This study

examines the impact of the Presidential Government System, adopted in Türkiye

through the 2017 constitutional amendments, on the independence and autonomy of

regulatory and supervisory agencies (RSAs). The primary objective is to assess

how the structural and functional transformation introduced by the new system

has affected the ability of these institutions to make decisions free from

political influence. <o:p></o:p>

Using

content analysis, the research conducts a comparative evaluation of eleven RSAs

based on key indicators such as administrative structure, appointment and

dismissal procedures, tenure security, relationships with the legislative and

executive branches, financial resources, and accountability mechanisms. The

findings reveal that although these agencies maintain a legal framework that

emphasizes independence, their de facto dependence on the executive has

intensified. In particular, centralized practices in appointments and budgetary

control have significantly weakened their institutional autonomy. This study

contributes to a deeper understanding of how the centralization of executive

power under the Presidential System has redefined the role and functioning of

RSAs. It highlights the tension between administrative efficiency and

democratic oversight, and questions the sustainability of institutional

independence in a politically consolidated governance model. By situating RSAs

within the broader context of the rule of law and good governance, the research

offers an original and critical perspective to the literature on public law and

administrative reform. <o:p></o:p>

Keywords:

Presidential Government System, Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies,

Institutional Independence, Autonomy, Public Administration.<o:p></o:p>